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CiCero’s ears, or eloquenCe in the  
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Moderation, and the subliMe in 
enlightenMent sCotland 
Catherine Packham
About a page into his essay “Of Eloquence,” first published in 1742, David 
Hume identifies the orator Cicero as “the most eloquent speaker, that had ever 
appeared in Rome.” Cicero’s pre-eminence, however, brings with it a problem. 
“Those of fine taste,” Hume tells us, judged that Cicero, together with the Greek 
orator Demosthenes, “surpassed in eloquence all that had ever appeared, but that 
they were far from reaching the perfection of their art, which was infinite, and not 
only exceeded human force to attain, but human imagination to conceive.”1 Even 
Cicero himself was dissatisfied with his performances, asserting that his ears were 
“greedy and insatiate,” and yearned for “something vast and boundless:” a sub-
lime peak of oratorical achievement beyond realisation and even conception, but 
whose possibility was somehow suggested by the very desires of his own nature.2 
Cicero’s ears, signs of the undesirable passions of greed and appetite, but 
also of further, as yet unattained, possibilities of human achievement, mark the 
central crux of Hume’s essay, as it considers how to transform a human nature 
whose passions are described as “stubborn and intractable” in the essay’s opening 
paragraph, into a more moderate, modified form appropriate for the eighteenth 
century’s polite age. This question—a persistent one in the writings of Hume and 
his Scottish contemporaries—is approached through the question of eloquence, 
another recurring preoccupation in post-Union Scotland and beyond, and one for 
which Cicero and Demosthenes were entirely conventional markers. Ostensibly, 
Hume’s essay might be read as a call for the reinvigoration of modern oratory, 
which thus imagines an emulation, but also a moderation, of its ancient practices. 
Catherine Packham is senior lecturer in English at the University of Sussex. She is author of 
Eighteenth-Century Vitalism (2012) and has published a number of articles on philosophical 
writing in the Scottish Enlightenment.
© 2013 by the ASECS
Eighteenth-Century Studies Vol. 46, No. 4500
But Hume’s evocation of Cicero as the model orator points in two directions. On 
the one hand, Cicero’s ears recognise the sublime possibilities of oratory which we 
moderns, Hume goes on to lament, evidently lack. The “single circumstance” of 
Cicero’s dissatisfaction, Hume adds in later editions of the essay, “is sufficient to 
make us apprehend the wide difference between ancient and modern eloquence, 
and to let us see how much the latter is inferior to the former” (H 621, note b). 
But on the other hand, Cicero’s ears also mark out the complex moral territory of 
an elusive sublime which stimulates dangerous and excessive passions in a search 
which, given the defining evasiveness of its goal, will never come to an end. Given 
this, how could a responsible essayist exhort his contemporaries to replicate ancient 
oratory? Should he, by contrast, rather advise them to rest satisfied in the more 
“mediocre” achievements of modern public speech?
Hume’s essay circulates between these two opposed possibilities, appear-
ing at different points to recommend both as solutions to the question of modern 
eloquence. The essay’s thoroughness, contradictions and conscious ironies contrib-
ute to the considerable interpretative difficulties which it poses, although recent 
commentators have tended to see Hume as calling for a modern moderation which 
abandons the heights of ancient sublimities for a mediocre, but moral, speech. For 
Adam Potkay, a resolution to the essay’s proliferating ironies is eventually reached 
by Hume’s turning, in the essay’s final stages, towards an “unruffled acceptance 
of the deficiencies of British oratory;” for Jerome Christensen, who reads Hume’s 
career as a whole as that of the modern man of letters remediating and succeed-
ing the ancient orator, the essay represents the clearest example of a “strategic 
moderation” which deliberately severed links with the admirable oratory of the 
past, to prescribe instead the mundane, writerly virtues of “ordonnance,” or order 
and method.3 In such readings, the apparent praise which Hume lavishes on the 
oratory of the ancients operates as cover under which to set out the more modest 
possibilities at which modern speech might aim, and the at times “monstrous” 
eloquence of Cicero is implicitly replaced by the easy conversational orderliness 
of Hume’s own style.
Something powerfully present escapes such readings, however, just as it 
evades capture by Cicero’s ears. If Hume’s aim is to warn against the dangerous 
sublime of ancient oratory, it is not clear why he spends so much time in the essay 
exploring it—or even why he expresses the hope that moderation might fail (“A 
few successful attempts of this nature might rouze the genius of the nation, excite 
the emulation of the youth, and accustom our ears to a more sublime and more 
pathetic elocution, than we have been hitherto entertained with,” H 106). Arguably, 
the residual power and fascination of the sublime itself is what motivates Hume’s 
essay, just as it was a recurring focus of philosophical thought in eighteenth-century 
Scotland. The argument that sublime eloquence must be sacrificed in a polite age 
does not do justice to the commitment of Hume and other thinkers to working 
out the complexity of the problem of accommodating the sublime to modernity, 
a problem to which, as this paper will argue, the essay is one attempted solution. 
Hume’s interest in oratory can be read—as Potkay does—as political and historical, 
but it is also philosophical, and manifests Hume’s on-going concern, begun in his 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and continuing into his Enquiries and essays, 
with human nature and affective experience, in life and in art. As an excessive 
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test-case for the appetites and desires of the subject, the sublime is clearly central 
to Hume’s philosophical investigation of human passions, as well as his essayistic 
concern to moderate them for a polite age, and his investigation of the presence of 
the sublime in oratory is thus necessarily connected to his explanations of human 
morality and social feeling. In this context, it is significant that Hume begins his 
essay not with eloquence itself, but with precisely the question of human nature, its 
passions, and its moderation; it is significant too that he ends the essay by looking 
to taste not only as a moderating mechanism but also as a potentially elevating 
one.4 Recommending that modern taste, even informed by a full sense of historical 
irony, accommodates itself to the safely mediocre, doesn’t fully address the human 
propensity—increasingly and overwhelmingly documented by innumerable taxono-
mists of sublime cause and effect throughout this period—to be powerfully moved 
by the sublime and other forms of affective experience.5 After all, the sublime itself 
bears witness to the compelling, seemingly transhistorical appeal of infinitude and 
transcendent limitlessness. 
At the same time, Hume’s essay also needs to be understood as an attempt 
to reconcile certain uneasy oppositions within Scottish commercial humanism. It 
asks not simply whether Ciceronian eloquence can find a place in the age of the 
coffeehouse, but also how any modification of it would rework liberties tradition-
ally associated with eloquence, whose possibilities in a commercial age needed to 
be fully understood. The essay’s recognition of oratory’s harnessing of the passions 
of speaker and listeners refracts an acute awareness of the centrality of passions to 
new Scottish Enlightenment understandings of reason and morality (produced in 
large part by Hume himself); through a consideration of the cultural power of the 
passions in ancient oratory, it explores, perhaps ambivalently, their centrality in 
politics and beyond in the current age of sentiment. And finally, given the frequent 
association between sublime oratory and auspicious historical epochs (in Hume’s 
essay and in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments too), the essay asks how a modern 
age, if it modifies its public speech, can retain the supreme virtues of the classical 
past.6 If modernity modifies the excesses of the past—in its speech, its passions, its 
sublimities—is it necessarily mediocre? How can a modern, moderate age retain a 
place for the sublime? Does modern virtue lie merely in adaptability and propriety, 
or can it ever be sublime?7
“Of Eloquence” must be read then as an investigation into the complex 
problems of commercial modernity, as manifested in sublime style itself. Certainly 
the essay, with its bathetic conclusion recommending the banalities of proper or-
der and method, stages a confrontation between styles, between mediocrity and 
transcendent excess. But it also explores through them the historical opposition 
of the ancients and modernity, and the possibility of charting a progress from the 
one to the other—a progress which risks running aground on the persistence of 
human nature, and indeed the sublime itself. The very difference of the moderns 
from the ancients, which the essay exhorts and upholds, depends on the possibility 
of moderating human nature, a possibility at odds with the transhistorical power 
of the sublime to which our ears, as well as Cicero’s, attest. Human nature, not the 
sublime, is ultimately what Hume’s essay seeks to tame and control; put differently, 
human nature itself becomes the elusive sublime object which the essay confronts 
and debates. Hume’s task in this essay, on which the possibility of escaping the past, 
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and the circular logic of the essay itself depends, is the formulation of a means of 
regulating the very passions in which human nature consists. In this way, Hume’s 
essay inherits the sublime of ancient oratory not as a narrowly stylistic concern – 
though style is a means by which it might be addressed – but as a moral problem 
at the heart of modern subjectivity.
SCOTTISH CICERONIANISM 
In foregrounding the figure of Cicero in its consideration of classical 
eloquence, Hume’s essay is entirely conventional, but it is equally provocative in 
allowing such questions and ambivalences as have already been outlined to revolve 
around him. Cicero was a central and iconic figure in eighteenth-century Scotland, 
whose importance was recognised on many fronts. Most obviously, Cicero was 
a foundational authority in the moral teaching of Scottish universities, listed, for 
instance, alongside Marcus Antonius, Pufendorf, and Bacon as the chief authors 
discussed in the practical ethics lectures of Sir John Pringle, Edinburgh Professor of 
Moral Philosophy.8 Cicero’s emphasis on practical morality was especially palatable 
to post-Union universities who, fresh from the bruising experience of the 1690s 
Visitation—an attempt to limit university teaching to Calvinist orthodoxies—were 
keen to find ways for broader social engagement.9 As Peter Jones has demonstrated, 
Scottish universities presented their newly formed liberal arts teachings as a “vital 
forming-process for the character of citizens in a modern Scottish res publica,” and 
Cicero, as a figure who, in de Oratore, had found a way to rescue ancient learning 
(“sapientia”) from increasingly recondite specialisms to the practical centres of 
civic life, was thus a compelling model.10 That it was through eloquence that this 
practical engagement was achieved only heightened Cicero’s attractions for a Scot-
tish context where, since at least the Reformation, the cultural power of oratory, 
and what David Allan has described as its “moralistic and exhortatory purposes,” 
were long recognised.11 For George Campbell, author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric 
(1776), oratory inspired men in their public duty; in the newly formulated “moral 
culture” of eighteenth-century Scotland, it was a prominent expression of the wis-
dom of the civilised and virtuous man.12 That this conception dovetailed with the 
role of universities in preparing young men for careers as church ministers, lawyers, 
or other roles where public speech was important only underlined the significance 
of oratory for them; it is not for nothing that important accounts of language use, 
rhetoric and speech in the Scottish Enlightenment, including those of Adam Smith 
and Hugh Blair, are strongly associated with such a pedagogical context.13
Scottish concern with eloquence thus opens out into larger cultural and 
political domains, and Cicero figures too in such larger contexts: he is a crucial and 
recurring figure in the attempts of post-Union Scotland to steer its way towards a 
theorization of commercial modernity. Renaissance humanists had drawn on Cicero-
nianism to manage or mediate the potential conflict between virtue and commerce, 
a project which, as Pocock has described, was revisited by early eighteenth-century 
Whig philosophers looking for an alternative to the classical ideal “of the citizen as 
armed proprietor.”14 For Pocock, the vindication of this “regime” of commercial 
modernity “entailed an opposition between ancient and modern,” but one of the 
most influential proponents of a polite Whig ideology, Joseph Addison, draws at 
points quite explicitly on a Ciceronian heritage to articulate the new polite amal-
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gamation of social, cultural, and commercial values.15 Whilst Pocock locates the 
origins of politeness in the Restoration’s countering of the “prophetic religiosity” 
of the mid-seventeenth century, one of Addison’s most famous ambitions, to bring 
“Philosophy out of Closets and Libraries . . . to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, 
at Tea-Tables and in Coffee-Houses,” repeats Cicero’s own account of Socrates’s 
conversational philosophy which called “philosophy down from the heavens and 
set her in the cities of men . . . and also into their homes.”16 That Hume himself 
in “Of Essay-Writing” repeats a version of such a claim (“I cannot but consider 
myself as a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning 
to those of Conversation”) shows not only the persistence of Ciceronianism in 
eighteenth-century Scottish thought, but also that Hume himself—in this regard 
at least—happily took up the mantle of Addison’s “intellectual ancestor.”17
Hume’s pose here—as essayist, conversationalist, and inheritor of Ad-
dison’s Ciceronianism—places him in an intellectual genealogy traceable back to 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Shaftesbury drew on Cicero’s blend of eloquence and 
philosophy as a means to describe the cultivation of virtue, in a philosophical project 
closely related to Addisonian politeness, and he claimed Cicero as a predecessor 
in the genre of essay writing. For Shaftesbury, the essay combined philosophy and 
rhetoric, offering the means by which both might be deployed “with the greatest 
Force.”18 For Hutcheson meanwhile, Cicero with Shaftesbury and Locke informed 
the development of an empirical moral philosophy which Nicholas Phillipson has 
described as “a neo-Ciceronian science of morals.”19 Whilst the Addisonian nature 
of politeness in post-Union Scotland has been widely recognized—in the sociable 
forms of the essay, the conversation, and the club—the sustaining Ciceronianism 
of these cultural formations has been less remarked.20
Politeness of course was not just a cultural style or form, although, as 
Pocock says, the “advancement of a polite style” was Addison’s “supreme achieve-
ment.”21 Rather, in its manifestation in post-Union Scotland, it represented part 
of a fully developed theorization of commercial modernity, society, and politics 
adequate to the needs of a nation bereft (since the loss of the Edinburgh parliament) 
of local political representation.22 Here, central questions concerned the need to 
understand how virtue might be possible in a commercial society, given the asso-
ciation between the passions and consumption; understanding virtue as acquired 
in ways other than participation in political life (given the loss of the parliament); 
and understanding how liberty might be safeguarded in commercial society. The 
assumption that the state of eloquence reflected a nation’s larger political and 
moral health (an ancient tenet transmitted to modernity via Shaftesbury) was en-
tirely axiomatic in eighteenth-century Scotland—repeatedly stressed, for instance, 
in student essays written for John Stevenson, Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in 
Edinburgh from 1730.23 Scottish preoccupation with the eloquence necessary for 
self-advancement in a polite age was thus not merely about proper form, but was 
underpinned by deeper political, philosophical, and cultural questions crucial to 
its historical moment. 
The conjunction of Ciceronian eloquence and Addisonian politeness in 
post-Union Scotland was an uneasy, double-edged one, however, and marks some 
complexly interconnected issues on which Hume’s essay is poised, which it investi-
gates, and which it to some extent reproduces. On the one hand, the easy eloquence 
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of the coffeehouse or essay connotes polite sociability, virtuousness, moderation, 
and liberty—an attractive discursive mode for an age keen to counter the suspicion 
that its more representative form of speech was what Adam Smith described as the 
divisive and self-interested “higgling and bargaining” of commercial society.24 On 
the other hand, eloquence brought rather darker baggage: potential associations 
with authoritarianism, passivity, tyranny, passions, and excess.25 The historical con-
catenation of eloquence and liberty meant that such political and social questions 
could be expressed, as in “Of Eloquence,” as an aesthetic one—about the possibility 
of a modern sublime. Hume’s engagement with eloquence is more than an interven-
tion in modern politics: it is a deeply committed consideration of subjectivity and 
virtue in commercial society. In setting the auspicious but “greedy” speech of the 
past against the moderate virtues of the present, it articulates an uneasy problem 
of historical identity, which can be resolved only by modern resignation to virtuous 
mediocrity—a resignation which still leaves space for a nostalgic fantasy of the 
sublime return of the past.26 In this context, it seems entirely significant that the 
account of taste which Hume offers in the concluding section of the essay operates 
largely as a mechanism for social accommodation to mediocrity, whilst neverthe-
less remaining open to the possibility of virtuous inflation—in stark contrast to 
the more optimistic account of taste outlined in “Of the Standard of Taste.” But 
where Hume more or less excludes the sublime from the regulatory mechanism of 
polite taste, Adam Smith offers a triumphant account of modern morality which 
escapes the past by relocating the sublime as the incentivising pinnacle of virtuous 
possibilities. 
THE PROBLEM OF ELOQUENCE 
Given these larger concerns, it is significant that Hume opens his essay 
with human history and human passions, rather than with eloquence. His first 
sentence offers us the object of human history, presented not abstractly but kept 
personable, by being framed in aesthetic terms as spectacle or entertainment: 
“[t]hose, who consider the periods and revolutions of human kind, as represented 
in history, are entertained with a spectacle full of pleasure and variety” (H 97). 
Keeping the question of oratory itself politely at bay, Hume amuses his readers 
with history’s pageant, and the historicity or otherwise of human nature itself. 
Such an opening foregrounds the historical nature of the essay’s project, which 
explores historical differences but also shows how human nature, whilst at one 
level constant across time, is also, crucially, capable of historical modulation. 
That we are moved—moderately—by history announces the essay’s concern with 
investigating and moderating the powers of affect and, as we will see, Hume looks 
to taste—a historically moderated means of experiencing aesthetic pleasure—to 
achieve the moderation of his age. This concern with taste is already anticipated 
in Hume’s construction of his audience, which, both as essay readers and as his-
torical onlookers, is characterised by something between moderated interest and 
amused detachment. Pleasure in both the spectacle of history, and in essay reading 
itself, is the very model of moderation. Proportionate and reasonable, rather than 
excessive and overwhelming, our ears, or our eyes, do not like Cicero’s yearn for 
the vast and boundless, but rather are more simply and modestly “entertained” 
and “surprized” with “pleasure and variety” (H 97). The moderation of human 
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nature and its capacity for pleasure, which is at the heart of Hume’s essay, is thus 
cemented in its own style.
If moderation for Hume is a historical problem, his essay—in its turn 
to taste, and in its own stylistic moderation—suggests there is an aesthetic solu-
tion. Hume’s friend Adam Smith also understood the passions of human nature 
historically, but rather differently from Hume: for Smith, a “humane and polished 
people,” because more willing to “enter into” each other’s feelings, more read-
ily pardon what is excessive in them (TMS 207). Where Hume looks to modern 
taste to moderate passions, Smith finds in modernity a potentiality for excess. 
Fear of passionate excess—and perhaps a longing for it—haunts Hume’s essay as 
something to be brought under control, but Smith makes such “entering into,” 
or sympathising with, the feelings of others central to the moderating impulses of 
his own moral philosophy. As we will see, he does so by harnessing the power of 
what Cicero calls the yearning for the “vast and boundless.” As Peter de Bolla has 
commented, Smith insists on the “ethical sustainability of sublime affect,” despite 
the “extremes of self-interest” which it represents.27 His moral theory cleverly trans-
forms the yearning in human nature for the excessive and infinite into something 
which raises our sense of moral possibility and our standards of virtue, recouping 
what Hume fears are dangerous infinitudes of sublime excess for their ethically 
inflationary effects. In this way, a clear route for the progress of human nature is 
mapped out which might free it from the recurring cycles of history and of taste, 
which Hume ironically views, and in which the present never fully frees itself either 
from the shadow cast by the sublime achievements of the past, or from the desire 
to attempt to repeat them. 
For both Hume and Smith, the sublime represents a test case and a prob-
lem for the Scottish Enlightenment project of moderation. How can the human 
propensity to be moved be balanced with the need to regulate its powerful potential 
for excess? “Of Eloquence” approaches human affect via one of its causes, oratory, 
whilst Smith’s moral theory places that power to be moved at its very heart. The 
sublime, of course, is that which goes beyond the limits assigned to it, and Cicero’s 
ears show how this “going beyond” is at once both morally problematic and (even 
more problematically) desirable. Further, the transgressive excess which the sublime 
enjoins is never recouped, because what it points towards can never be arrived at: 
Cicero never hears what his ears yearn for. Smith, the philosopher of a political 
economy which can too often be understood as the theorization of the economic 
means by which, through exchange of goods, services, labour, value, and so on, 
people arrive at what they want, was preoccupied in his ethical thought with the 
productive possibilities of not arriving at what is desired: with the desirability, 
morally speaking, of insatiability, and its ethical (as well as economic) leverage. 
But where Smith approaches excessive affect as a moral problem and recoups its 
inflationary possibilities, Hume approaches it as something which might be akin 
to a problem in art and offers a regulatory mechanism which threatens merely to 
repeat a circularity of desire and regulation in an uneasy, repetitive cycle.
In an essay which manifests numerous and changeable attitudes to elo-
quence, Hume is at his most vehement, even disgusted, when he characterises it 
as a “monstrous,” even ridiculous art form. “What noble art and sublime talents 
are requisite to arrive, by just degrees, at a sentiment so bold and excessive,” he 
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comments, “to inflame the audience, so as to make them accompany the speaker 
in such violent passions, and such elevated conceptions: And to conceal, under a 
torrent of eloquence, the artifice, by which all this is effectuated!” (H 101). Hume’s 
horror at the concealed artifice is itself artfully insinuated in 1768 into an essay 
which had already been published in at least ten editions over the previous twenty 
years: an exclamation over the immorality and irresponsibility of the orator’s ar-
tificial manufacture of passion condemns a rhetorical artfulness in which it itself 
participates. But the larger problem here is that, although Hume calls it an “art” 
and tries to write it off in this instance at least as bad art, sublime oratory cannot 
quite be shunted off into a separate realm of aesthetic performance, not least because 
of its strong political associations, its role in public life, the law courts, parliament, 
and so on. The problem of excessive passions, of being moved beyond established 
bounds or limits, whilst pertaining to art, is not limited to it.
Nevertheless Hume looks to the regulatory mechanism of taste to control 
such excesses, both explicitly in the final stages of his essay, and implicitly through 
the “tasteful” and polite manner of his own writing and its constructed reader. But 
Hume’s taste is radically ambivalent: whilst he seeks to establish a popular taste 
for modest and polite oratory, he also, nostalgically, leaves open the possibility of 
a resurgence of the sublime past. At the end of his essay, Hume looks to the com-
munity of popular taste to close down and regulate the powerful forces of human 
affect which the essay has investigated (as well as exploited and been moved by in 
its turn). But the inability of the “taste community” to solve the problem which 
Hume investigates has already been established in the essay’s first paragraphs, 
where it is not only Cicero, but “[t]hose of fine taste” who recognised that even the 
greatest speakers of their age “were far from reaching the perfection of their art” 
(H 98).28 The power of taste as a potential force of moderation is diminished by 
its very cultivation of the propensity to be moved for which the sublime represents 
the logical endpoint. 
The problem of the sublime thus exceeds the taste by which Hume attempts 
to regulate it—a fact perhaps recognised by Hume’s ongoing revisions to the es-
say through to the 1760s, which Adam Potkay reads as evidence of a hardening 
opposition to a figurative language which is deemed to be at odds with the polite 
age.29 For Potkay, Hume’s ambivalence towards oratory becomes oppositional in the 
1760s, under the pressure of what for Potkay is at that point the newly felt power 
of polite ideology. But such a reading assumes that figurative language is itself the 
object of regulation in Hume’s essay, rather than a sign or symptom of sublime 
excesses to which human nature is constantly drawn, and which itself demands 
explanation. Potkay quotes Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (“The 
behaviour which is reckoned polite in England is a calm, composed, unpassion-
ate serenity noways ruffled by passion”) as evidence of a turn against figurative 
language, but this does not explain why Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, first 
published in 1759, and again in revised editions through to 1790, looks for a return 
of ancient oratory in contemporary Britain.30 Smith, in fact, suggests the picture 
in relation to figurative language is rather more complex than Potkay implies, 
because although the Lectures downplay the traditional importance of figurative 
language in public speaking, Smith nevertheless spends some time analyzing the 
use of figures by Addison, who for Smith exemplifies polite style.31 The overriding 
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concern in Smith’s discussion of language use, however, is that it should be ap-
propriate to context—hence perhaps his ability to welcome revived eloquence in 
a parliamentary context—but this emphasis on context is in turn due to Smith’s 
insistence on the role of sympathy in communication. Language use should be ap-
propriate to the character, aims, and situation of the speaker in order to achieve 
the easiest possible communication via the sympathies of the listener. For Smith, 
questions about figurative language arise within a larger description of forms of 
conduct appropriate to contemporary civil society: this is what enables Smith to 
welcome sublime language where appropriate, and even to use it himself at times, 
not least in describing the operation of a regulatory mechanism for excessive affect 
which will itself be seen as sublime.
Smith’s prescriptions on language use (and thus style) are fundamentally 
concerned with securing social cohesion via collective, communal feeling founded 
on the operation of sympathy. This turn from eloquence to sympathy had in fact 
already been anticipated in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, where the power of 
eloquence (“Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than 
eloquence . . . . We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, 
and another odious; but ’till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to 
these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affec-
tions,” H 426–27) is succeeded by sympathy (“eloquence is not always necessary. 
The bare opinion of another, especially when inforc’d with passion, will cause an 
idea of good or evil to have an influence upon us . . . . This proceeds from the 
principle of sympathy,” H 427). For Smith, sympathy is a moral principle, and 
thus the apparent stylistic opposition between politeness and the sublime can be 
subsumed into a larger account of the ethics of sympathy on which civil society is 
founded. Moreover, far from being at odds with it, the sublime can be harnessed 
to further the aims of polite society.
At one level, Smith’s attitude to the sublime is revisionist. Smith’s asser-
tion, in the Lectures on Rhetoric, that “all that is noble and grand and sublime” in 
language lies not in figures of speech but in “the sentiment of the speaker” being 
“expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever manner” (TMS 25) already modifies 
sublime oratory in the direction of the beautiful, and this reassessment of aesthetico-
moral values recurs in the sixth edition of Theory of Moral Sentiments, where 
sublime oratory is attacked not on stylistic grounds but because of its politically 
dangerous application.32 In a passage written in 1789 for the last edition of the 
work published before his death, conventionally read as a response to the French 
Revolution, Smith warns of the politician whose “spirit of system” and sublime 
rhetoric transforms a “gentle public spirit” into the “madness of fanaticism” (TMS 
232). Against the “splendid” and “dazzling” actions of the “hero, statesman or 
legislator” (TMS 242) he offers the modest virtues of the prudent man, the value 
of whose steady, dependable, moderate qualities are thereby thrown into relief. 
Smith’s desire in 1789 to counter what he increasingly perceives as a worrying 
tendency to admire the rich and the great even leads him into direct opposition at 
times with Cicero and indeed Addison.33 Recounting Caesar’s acknowledgement, 
in the face of conspiracies against him, that he was ready to die, Cicero comments 
in exhortative vein that Caesar had not lived long enough for the good of Rome, 
but Smith’s response is very different. “[T]he man who felt himself the object of 
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such deadly resentment, from those whose favour he wished to gain, and whom 
he still wished to consider his friends, had certainly lived too long for real glory; 
or for all the happiness which he could ever hope to enjoy in the love and esteem 
of his equals” (TMS 66). Smith’s harsh, even abrasive, moral exegesis runs directly 
counter to Cicero’s uncritical elevation of Caesar and Rome, and is supported by 
emphasising how Caesar had exceeded any possible sympathies from his friends 
and equals. Sympathetic judgement provides the moral grounding point which 
eludes sublime oratory.34 
In this instance, judgements founded on sympathy (or its limits) figure as 
an alternative to the ethical failures of the sublime. But Smith is equally ready, in 
the fullest expression of his revisionism, to relocate the sublime precisely in the sym-
pathetic judgements of moral spectators—or in the possibility of their enactment. 
This determination to find a moral potentiality in affect—in our being moved by 
others, in our ability to enter into the feelings of others—means that his attitude to 
Cicero (despite the difference over Caesar) differs starkly from Hume’s. For Smith, 
Cicero’s ability to enter into the feelings of others is a sign of the readiness, in polite 
and civilised nations, to “enter into an animated and passionate behaviour” (TMS 
207–28), in contrast to the self-command enjoined in more “barbarous” ones. That 
Cicero could “without degrading himself, weep with all the bitterness of sorrow in 
the sight of the whole senate and the whole people” is a sign of politeness, rather 
than excess, and it is this possibility which Smith elevates to the status of the sublime. 
Smith’s moral theory is founded on the acts of sympathy, and the implicit 
judgements contained therein, which operate between participants in polite society. 
But the myriad different forms of sympathetic judgement which might conceivably 
take place between social participants in complex modern society are regulated at 
a higher level by a further concept, of the impartial spectator, an at least partially 
theoretical, but nevertheless operative, configuration who provides the ultimate 
foundation for moral judgements on ourselves and on others. The impartial spec-
tator, or the man within the breast, as Smith also terms him, is the centrepiece of 
Smith’s complex machinery of moral moderation, providing the means by which 
our own inevitably partial and prejudiced judgments, which tend to indulge our 
behaviour and be critical of others, are regulated and corrected. But, with attractive 
concision, as well as regulating, the impartial spectator also provides the means 
by which greater, even sublime, virtues can be envisaged and enacted: that which 
moderates and regulates also points the way to elevation and moral greatness. It 
is only fitting, then, that it is for this moderating as well as exhorting overseer that 
Smith reserves a language of the sublime. “There exists in the mind of every man,” 
Smith tells us, an idea of [exact propriety and perfection], gradually formed from his 
observations upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people. It 
is the slow, gradual, and progressive work of the great demigod within the breast, 
the great judge and arbiter of conduct” (TMS 247). This idea is an “archetype of 
perfection,” a work of “exquisite and divine beauty,” and the sublime pinnacle of 
Smith’s moral thinking. 
Like Hume’s taste, Smith’s impartial spectator is at one level a regulatory 
mechanism to control the potential excesses of passion to which his own historical 
sociology, as well as his economic theory, tells him the modern age is vulnerable: 
it seeks to secure social cohesion in a polite and commercial age. Unlike Hume’s 
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taste, which in relation to oratory is, he tells us, particularly skewed towards 
popular forms of judgment, Smith’s impartial spectator works not to favor the 
moderate and the mediocre, but to signal the possibility of moral greatness. In the 
context of a modern commercial society which feared that, as Phillipson describes, 
pursuit of economic benefits entailed the possibility of no “higher virtue than mere 
adaptability,” the impartial spectator points to the possibility of sublime virtues, 
acts, and speech receiving wide approval. A more compelling ethical model than 
the modest, moderate, prudent man, Smith shows that virtue, even in the polite 
age, could be more than mere propriety—but he does so without undermining the 
basis for a foundational propriety which sympathetic judgements also approve.35 
Perhaps the most supreme virtue for Smith’s impartial spectator is self-
command, the quality increasingly stressed in the final edition of Theory of Moral 
Sentiments to appear in Smith’s lifetime. As Luigi Turco has commented, this is 
a “distant relation of the Stoic’s apathy,” and thus Cicero, one of the three main 
authors from whom the strong Stoic tendencies in Smith are derived, makes a 
kind of return.36 In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume char-
acterises Stoicism as at once “specious and sublime,” and as a “refined system of 
selfishness.”37 Temperamentally and philosophically drawn to the skeptics, Hume 
cannot share in the possibility of moral elevation which Smith finds in their Stoic 
opponents. But the sublime possibility of self-command approved by the impartial 
spectator, which The Theory of Moral Sentiments holds out as its ultimate virtue, 
is very different from the sublime for which Cicero’s ears yearned. Unlike Cicero’s, 
Smith’s sublime is palpable, present, accessible, and elevating, and it is at least 
partially achievable. Unlike Cicero’s, it is, or could be, actual not imaginary, and 
whilst the sublime for which Cicero yearns speaks to the insatiable, uncontrollable 
appetites of human nature, Smith’s moral sublime offers a means of transforming 
those same yearning tendencies to the moral good. 
The sublime sought by Cicero’s oratory was momentary, even tyrannical in 
its absorption of speaker and listener into an overwhelming experience of passionate 
expression; as Jerome Christensen has described, its very sublimity, abstract and 
disengaged, entailed “the dissolution of all object relations.”38 In an early meth-
odological essay, Smith offers a version of a “philosophical” sublime in describing 
the wonder and pleasure experienced by the philosopher in forging explanatory 
connections between cause and effect to make a philosophical system.39 In the terms 
of his later Wealth of Nation’s account of the division of labour, this runs the risk of 
securing for the philosopher an intellectually and aesthetically pleasurable form of 
work whilst others suffer the mental alienation of arduous, repetitive wage-labour. 
Against this, the mechanism of the impartial spectator outlined in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments makes a moral sublime available to all social participants. Far 
from having no relation to orator or audience, the ethical sublime expresses, con-
solidates and furthers social relations: not as the dissolution of object relations, 
but as their apotheosis. Recouping excess as an ethical possibility, and establishing 
the sublime as a modern, moral principle, Smith ensured that the human capacity 
for affect which his age shared with the ancients became a matter not merely of 
entertainment or art or even public speech, but of virtuous social relations capable 
of exceeding the merely proper forms of a polite age. 
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